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Applications of
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databases
Thomas Hardjono and
Jennifer Seberry
Centre for Computer Security Research, Department of Computer Science,
University ofWollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia

In this paper we describe a practical solution towards anonymous and verifiable databases based on the use of smartcards
and the recent Improved Leighton-Micali protocol for the
distribution of keys. The scheme is addressed particularly to
public data held in separate government databases with the
aim of preventing unauthorized government institutions from
gathering and merging private data concerning individuals
from these separate containers. The solution can be realized
through the recent Clipper Chip and smartcard technology,
and its security relies on the strength of these technologies.
The scheme is also extendible to mobile computing
environments.

Keywords: Security and protection, Database management,
Network protocols.

1. Introduction

ecurity of public data represents an issue which

Sis increasingly becoming important and relevant to all individuals within society. Public data
can range from statistics which bear no direct
impact on any given individual in society, to med-
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ical and financial information whose disclosure
may affect an individual's standing within society.
In traditional paper-based societies the gathering
of such personal information concerning a particular individual was difficult to perform due to the
shear amount of manual work involved. Hence,
only certain government bodies could afford such
data gathering based on some legal warrant.
In today's computerized world the collection and
transfer of voluminous amounts of information
over wide geographic distances has been accepted
as a common everyday occurrence. With recent
advances in fibre optics technology, the notion of
superhighways for data is becoming a reality. With
this increasing ease at which voluminous data can
be transferred and the increasing speed of data
processing systems, the capacity for data gathering
and intelligent computerized processing has also
been significantly increased. These advances,
which are beneficial to society from one point of
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view, have raised questions from the opposite
point of view, namely, of whether such computing power can be misused against society both by
certain individuals within the society and by the
very government upon which members of society
have placed their trust. Accepting that for the
functioning of a society some trust must be placed
by the society on its government, a method of
assurance must still be used to guarantee that an
individual's personal details, which are spread
across different government institutions, cannot
be illegally gathered and merged together to give a
total picture of that individual's private life.
One of the earliest efforts directed into finding
possible solutions to this problem is that by
Brandt et al. [1]. This effort recognized that databases belonging to different institutions must provide to the individual users the properties of the
users being anonymous and the databases being verifiable. More specifically, when different data items
are given by an individual to these distinct and
separate institutions, these data items should not
be identifiable by others as having come from the
one same individual. The true identity of each
individual must remain unknown to other individuals and to each institution. Each individual
must also have the ability to verifY that his or her
personal details held by an institution are correct.
In the current work we investigate the issue of
anonymous and verifiable databases in the context
of recent developments in tamper-proof hardware,
with the aim of presenting some practical solutions to the need of such databases. Our approach
is founded on the use of smartcard technology
coupled with an improved version of the recent
Leighton-Micali key distribution protocol [2, 3].
In the next section we discuss the motivations of
the current work, with the aim of placing Brandt's
work [1] in our context. This is followed in Section 3 by the description of the scheme, focusing
on the Improved Leighton-Micali protocol and
on the issues of anonymity, data storage and data
verifiability. Section 4 closes with some brief
remarks and conclusions.
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2. Motivations
The need of a practical scheme to realize the
notion of anonymous and verifiable databases is
becoming self-evident in computerized nations.
One recent example in Australia was the public
debate over the Australian Identity Card [4] by
which every Australian resident would be assigned
a unique number as an identifYing piece of information. This number would then be used as a
pointer to cross-reference data in various government institutions which held information concerning the owner of the number. Although this
move by the government was defeated, in actuality
the government later proceeded to use the citizens' taxation file numbers more or less as a substitute for the proposed identity card.
One important recent development in the United
States which has again brought the debate about
citizens' right to privacy into the foreground is the
introduction of the Clipper Chip [5, 6] and its
related technology. The Clipper Chip is a highspeed and high-security encryption device to be
used by the US Government for its telephone and
other networking equipment. The chip has a classified encipherment algorithm and contains a
secret key. Through a 'key-escrow' system an
appointed government agency can obtain a legal
warrant to wiretap communications between any
two parties that are using the device. The main
idea behind this notion is to provide secure communications to the users of the Chip against
external attacks, while at the same time allowing
the government to monitor communications that
are suspected of being a threat to national security
or to society in general (e.g. drug traffickers,
industrial espionage).
This paper extends the notions embodied in the
Clipper Chip concept towards another area,
namely that of providing ways to achieve anonymous and verifiable databases. We require the
appointed agency or authority to be a trusted
adjudicator between the members of society and
the other ordinary government institutions. In this
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way sensItIve data concerning citizens in general
may be guarded against illegal access while data
concerning suspected citizens can be made readily
available to the appointed authority. In the following discussion we will denote the appointed government agency as the Trusted Authority (TA). We
assume that each institution holds a database containing every individual's details which are relevant to the functioning of the institution. Any
exchange of data between departments must be
through the Trusted Authority who regulates as to
which details are exchangeable and who enforces
the chosen policies. Thus, for example, the taxation department holds taxation-related information, while the health department has a health
record of individuals that obtain medical service
from the government hospitals. An individual is
able to submit new details to each institution,
respectively, and each individual can query each
database independently without his or her identity
being revealed.
Each individual has the duty to initially enrol
himself or herself to the Trusted Authority, bringing their personal identification information (e.g.
birth certificate, retina scan, fingerprint, DNA
sequence). The Trusted Authority creates a pseudonym [1] for an individual corresponding to each
institution that holds data about the individual.
Hence, an individual has a different pseudonym
when dealing with each institution. For each individual, the Trusted Authority issues a tamperproof smartcard containing that individual's set of
pseudonyms and other cryptographic parameters.
For a given institution, the Trusted Authority also
issues cryptographic parameters which are stored
in the tamper-proof smartcard belonging to an
appointed trusted local authority (person) who is a
representative of the institution (e.g. system
administrator). Unlike the identity of individuals,
each institution has a unique identity which is
published.
The database at each institution is assumed to be
managed by a trusted DBMS which can be used
by staff members at the site only through a num-

ber of tamper-free terminals [7, 8]. These tamperfree terminals represent the only valid access
points to the database. A number of tamper-free
terminals are also provided at the site for use by
visiting individuals in the public, while remote
tamper-free terminals may also be connected provided that a secure channel can be created
between the remote tamper-free terminals and the
local tamper-free terminals. The appointed representative for an institution has the duty to periodically load the cryptographic parameters from his
or her smartcard to each of the resident tamperfree terminals at that institution. This configuration is shown in Fig. 1.

3. Towards a practical scheme
In this section we present a practical scheme for
anonymous and verifiable databases based on the
Improved Leighton-Micali (ILM) protocol [3].
The original Leighton-Micali protocol [2] had an
inherent flaw which in our context allowed an
attacker to read data belonging to an individual
when it was in transit between the institution and
the individual's terminal. This flaw has subsequently been solved and the protocol improved
Zheng's work [3].1
Following the requirements of [2, 3], we assume
that tamper-proof VLSI chips are readily available
to be incorporated into smartcards and tamperfree terminals. We also assume that a publicly
known one-way hash function h exists (which
may also be replaced with a cryptographically
strong pseudo-random function).
When an individual wishes to submit data to an
institution or to verity existing data held by an
institution, he or she must interact via a tamperfree terminal which establishes a connection with
another tamper-free terminal located at the institution. Communications between these two terminals must be via a session key which is selected
by either terminal and is transferred securely to
IThe work of [3] has recently been published in [9].
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Fig. 1. Anonymous individuals and verifiable databases.

the other.. The session key is then discarded by
both termmals after the session is over. Newly
submitted data is assumed to be placed in a temporary location within the institution's database to
be read, verified and classified by one of the institution's staff members. Only then can such data
be committed to the database. In the following,
we assume that all communications are protected
against replays (e.g. via timestamps or nonces).
3.1 Session keys: the ILM protocol

In the ILM protocol it is assumed that the Trusted Authority holds M secret keys (Xl. ... , X M ).
Each secret key is chosen uniformly at random by
the Trusted Authority and is of length k bits. For
each user i who is enrolled into the system, the
Trusted Authority selects M random integers (lXl'
... , IXM) from the interval [1, L], where L is an
integer?
The Trusted Authority then employs h to compute Y m = h"m (Xm) for all m = 1, ... , M, where
hS (X) indicates applying consecutively the func2Leighton and Micali recommended the size of M be of the
order 0 (B 3 logN), where N is the number of users and B is
the upper-bound on the number of dishonest users [2,9].
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tion h on an input X for s times. That is,
s

times

S

h (X) = h ( ... h (h(X)) .. . ).
Here (1X1> ... , IXM) becomes the public key of individual i which is known to all institutions. The
corresponding secret key (Yl. ... , YM) is then
placed by the Trusted Authority into the tamperproof chip of the individual's smartcard. The
smartcard is only delivered to the individual after
the secret key has been inserted, and hence no
person has access to the secret keys or the other
secret parameters within that individual's tamperproof chip.
Assuming that individual i needs to verifY or submit data to institution j, then their respective terminals must establish a secure channel by way of
encipherment using key K i•J • This secure channel
will afterwards be used to transfer the random
session key Ks. The crucial requirement at this
point is that both terminals must establish the
same key KiJ independently without previous communications. This process can be done as follows

Computers & Security, Vol. 14, No.5

[3 ]:
1. The terminal of individual i must obtain the
public key (Ph ... , 13M) of institution j. This
public key can be resident within each tamperfree terminal or it can be read by the terminal
from a publicly readable file.

2. Mter individual i inserts his or her smartcard
into the terminal, the terminal must provide
the smartcard with the public key of the institution j. The tamper-proof chip within the
smartcard of individual i then computes the
common key Ki,j as:

h (hOt (Xl) II hOM (XM ) II i II j),
{
Ki,j = h(hOt(X I ) II hOM (XM ) IU II i),

i~j,

i>j,
(1)

where (jm = max(am, 13m), m
II denotes concatenation.

= 1,

... , M and

Note that the tamper-proof chip can easily compute hOm(Xm ) = h I Om-"m I (Ym ) (m = 1, ... , M) and
thus K,j because it has available the values
Y m = h"m (Xm) residing in its internal memory. The
tamper-proof chip of the terminal at the institution performs symmetric procedures, and thus
obtains the same key ~,i = K,j [3].
In order to aid our subsequent discussions we will
simplify eq. (1) into

h(X II i IU),
{
Ki,j = h(X IU II i),

i~j,

i>j.

(2)

As before, the k-bit value X is chosen randomly
by the Trusted Authority where k should be sufficiently large, say k:2:: 100, in order to prevent it
from an exhaustive search attack [3]. The value X
is kept secret by the Trusted Authority, and during the enrolment of individuals the Trusted

Authority also injects a copy of X into the chip of
the smartcard belonging to the individual and into
that belonging to the local authority at each institution. Hence, in fact, the value X is common to
all parties in the system.
3.2 Anonymity

In order to provide anonymity to individuals
within the system, the Trusted Authority must
create distinct pseudonyms for each user with
respect to each of the institutions. In order to do
this each individual i must enrol in-person to the
Trusted Authority and provide it with some identification information Pi. The Trusted Authority
uniformly chooses a unique identity Ii and a
unique secret value Si, and associates them with
Pi. It is the duty of the Trusted Authority to keep
the values (Pi, Ii, Si' SCi) secure, where SCi is
the unique chip number built into the tamperproof chip of the individual's smartcard. The same
procedure is also observed for the local authority
of each institution.
Assuming that each institution has been assigned a
publicly known identity Bj , the Trusted Authority
creates the pseudonym Ii,j of the individual with
identity Ii with respect to Bj as:

Here we assume that the encoding scheme for the
identities of individuals Ii and institutions Bj is
uniform. The key STA is maintained as secret by
the Trusted Authority. The secret value Si and the
pseudonyms for an individual are then inserted
into that individual's chip. Similarly, each institution is given the respective pseudonym that the
individual will present to the institution.
Another secret parameter injected into the
tamper-proof chips of both the individual Ii,j and
the institution Bj is a database key Di,j, uniformly
chosen by the Trusted Authority, This database
key will be used to create other keys which are
further used to control access to the database.
Thus, for example, these created keys can be used
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to hide passwords of individuals, to encipher the
access matrix or to encipher the data in the database. In this paper we will use them to encipher
stored data, although it is clear to the reader that
other modes of their usage are possible.

3.3 Data storage
Within each institution B) data in the database
concerning individual Ii,j must be stored in such a
way that only the individual and the institution
(i.e. its staff) can view the data. Assuming Ri,j
represents the data of individual Ii,j at institution
Bj , a key KRiJ must be uniformly chosen by the
local authority within the institution to be applied
in order to hide data Ri,j' Bearing in mind that a
secure DBMS running above a secure operating
system is crucial for overall system security, there
are a number of ways in which data can be stored
in a manner that will make it accessible to users
only through the key KR'J' One simple method
through which data can be protected from unwanted disclosures is by way of direct encipherment
using the above key KR'J (see [10]).
This encipherment key KR'J must also reside in an
enciphered form under a key which is available to
the individual. This key-enciphering key is calculated by the staffs terminal at the institution as:
Ii,j~Bj,

(3)

Ii,j>Bj .

In addition, for each entry in the database belonging to the individual 1;,j a signature or checksum
[11, 12] must be created to prevent undetected
changes to the data without the individual's consent. This is achieved by using the values 5 i and 5j
which are in the tamper-proof chips of the individual and the institution's local authority,
respectively.
One simple way to create such signatures or
checksums is as follows. When the individual is
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requested by the institution to verify and approve
the data R i ,) about the individual to be committed
into the database, tamper-proof chips of the
respective parties must generate certain parameters
as input to some secure signature function sig.
Thus, the chip belonging to the individual 1;,j
creates ti ,) = h(R,) II 5 i liB), while the chip
belonging to the institution's local authority
creates f..
(note that here
'j,' = h (R·',j. II 5·
J II I·)
',j
ti ,) =1= 0.;). The two terminals onto which the individual and local authority are connected obtain the
respective values from the chip within the respective (inserted) smartcards, and then the terminals
exchange li,j and 0,i over the secure channel established previously using the session key.
receiving ti,j from the individual's terminal,
the institution's terminal then computes the signature for the individual's entry. That is, the entry
for individual Ii,j within the database of institution
B) is
Mter

where the symbol '{}K' denotes encipherment
using key K.
The institution's terminal then sends this complete entry (including the signature) and R i ,) to the
individual's terminal which re-computes the signature (if needed, the entry and the signature can
also be sent by the individual's terminal to a lawyer who represents the individual). If both signatures are identical, the individual's terminal
sends an acknowledgement to the terminal at the
institution. Both terminals then erase the values tiJ
and 0,i' In this manner, neither the individual nor
the institution can modify the data illegally, since
neither ti ,) nor 0,i are ever directly available to the
individual or the institution's staff, respectively.
Here we have illustrated a simple method for the
storage of data in an institution's database, focusing on the ease of access to the data from remote
tamper-free terminals. Other secure data storage
methods can be devised, and the reader is directed

Computers & Security, Vol. 14, No.5

to [10-12] for a more comprehensive discussion
on this particular issue.

involve the institution's terminal re-computing
and sending it to the individual's terminal
via a secure channel.
~,i

3.4 Verifiability

When an individual Ii,j wishes to view his or her
data Ri,j held at an institution B j the individual
must use his or her smartcard with a tamper-free
terminal:
1. The individual then selects via the tamper-free
terminal the identity of the institution Bj that
holds the data the individual wishes to view.

2. Mter inserting his or her smartcard into the
tamper-free terminal, the terminal provides the
smartcard - and thus the chip within - with
the identity Bj . The individual's terminal must
also indicate to the institution's tamper-free
terminal that a session is being requested. The
institution's terminal then looks up the identity
Ii,j of the individual.
3. The individual's chip then computes K,j, while
the chip within the institution's terminal computes 1<..;,i' As before, K,j = 1<..;,i'
4. The individual's terminal (or the institution's
terminal) generates a session key Ks. The session key Ks is then exchanged by way of enciphering it with Ki,j = 1<..;,i'
5. The institution's terminal then instructs the
database system to return the entry {KRi ) KE'J'
{R;,)KR'J' sig(Ri,j, ti,j, ~.i) for individual Ii,j'
This entry is enciphered using the session key
Ks and the result is dispatched to the individual's terminal.
6. The individual's terminal deciphers the entry
using the session key K" and the key-enciphering key KEi,j is recreated following eq. (3). The
individual's terminal then recovers K R . and
uses it to decipher and present to the indi~idual
the data Ri,j' The integrity of the data may also
be verified by way of recreating the signature in
the manner previously discussed. This would

4. Remarks and conclusion
In this paper we have extended the notions
embodied in the Clipper Chip concept towards
achieving anonymous and verifiable databases.
The Trusted Authority creates a pseudonym for
an individual corresponding to each institution
that holds data about the individual. Hence, an
individual has a different pseudonym when dealing with each institution. For each individual, the
Trusted Authority issues a tamper-proof smartcard containing that individuals's set of pseudonyms and other cryptographic parameters. The
database at each institution is assumed to be managed by a trusted DBMS which can be used by
staff members at the site only through a number
of tamper-free terminals. These tamper-free terminals represent the only valid access points to
the database. A number of tamper-free terminals
are also provided at the site for use by individuals
in the public, while remote tamper-free terminals
may also be connected, provided a secure channel
can be created between the remote tamper-free
terminals and the local tamper-free terminals.
When an individual wishes to submit data to an
institution or to verity existing data held by an
institution, he or she must interact via a tamperfree terminal which establishes a connection with
another tamper-free terminal located at the institution. Communications between these two terminals must be via a session key which is selected
by either terminal and is transferred securely to
the other. The session key is then discarded by
both terminals after the session is over.
The security of the scheme relies on the tamperresistance of the chips and the randomness of the
one-way hash function. To reduce the risk of
abusing stolen chips, authentication of a chip's
owner should be conducted by such means as
user password [3]. In its current stage the scheme
does not pretend to cover all possible points of
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attack, and clearly it does not provide a balanced
burden of trust between an individual and an
institution. Mter all, it is the institution that maintains the database containing the individual's private information. In practice it is difficult to
prevent an institution from creating an informal
and separate 'black list' database containing 'offthe-record' information upon which in reality it
bases its decisions concerning a given individual.
Other security measures are also required to prevent staff members of an institution from sharing
data illegally with other institutions (e.g. manually
copying onto a removable hard disk). The scheme
in this paper represents a first step towards providing a practical mechanism in the face of an
emerging new technology.
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